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1.  Introduction 
In an ‘age of enterprise’ (Courpasson/Reed 2004), bureaucratically organised compa-
nies are regarded as a dying breed (du Gay 2000). Since the 1980s, ‘enterprise within 
organisations’ has been propagated (Peters/Waterman 1982) as the better choice of 
governing organisations – or even as a cure-all (Nicholson/Anderson 2005) –, particu-
larly with regard to the public sector (e.g. du Gay 1996a; du Gay 2004; Osborne/ 
Gaebler 1997). The double promise inherent in the notion of an entrepreneurial or-
ganisation is that companies will profit from proactive, responsible, and flexible em-
ployees while the latter achieve freedom and self-determination (Peters/Waterman 
1982; Purser/Cabana 1998).
In contrast, others regard enterprise within organisations as a dangerous institu-
tionalisation of ‘new norms and techniques of conduct’ (du Gay 1996b: 152). Thus, 
like other forms of ‘culturism’ (Willmott 1993), the promise of autonomy, self-
responsibility, or even democracy is regarded as an instrument of power and control 
which leads to a specific identity of individuals (Burchell 1993; Deetz 1994; Miller/ 
Rose 1990; Rose 1990) while at the same time obscures the influence of companies on 
their employees (du Gay/Salaman 1992; Storey et al. 2005). 
When one takes a closer look at both advocates’ and critics’ perceptions of enter-
prise in organisations, two strong dichotomies emerge in the literature. First, entre-
preneurial companies are regarded as diametrically opposed to formal rules and the 
notion of bureaucracy – here critics and advocates do agree (du Gay 1994; Pe-
ters/Waterman 1982). Secondly, enterprise is either considered as bringing solely 
advantages for employees, such as more self-determination, empowerment and self-
fulfilment (Ouchi 1981; Peters/Waterman 1982), or it is regarded as a development 
that in the end merely allows organisations to control its members in a more powerful, 
sophisticated and intrusive way than bureaucracies do (Burchell 1993; Deetz 1994; 
Miller/Rose 1990; Rose 1990).  
Both dichotomies have recently been criticised for being too one-sided 
(Fournier/Grey 1999; Salaman/Storey 2008), leading to a more differentiated view 
conceptually (du Gay 2004), and empirically: First, it has been shown how an enter-
prise discourse is intertwined with other, non-entrepreneurial and also bureaucratic 
discourses inside organisations (Courpasson/Dany 2003; Korczynski 2004; Salaman/ 
Storey 2008). Secondly, the dichotomy between enterprise as a mere form of control 
or liberation has been questioned by examining how employees respond in different 
ways to – and even actively take advantage of – the notion of enterprise (Cohen/ 
Musson 2000; Halford/Leonard 2006; McDonald et al. 2008). 
Yet, in these critiques, enterprise on an organisational level seems mainly to be a 
clear-cut, unambiguous way of organising and governing an organisation. It is, for ex-
ample, characterised by flexible structures, autonomy and self-regulation which can 
serve as powerful control strategies (du Gay 1994; du Gay 1996b). In cases where in-
dividuals interpret these strategies differently or where bureaucratic elements still re-
main, enterprise seems to be not ‘fully working’ or not fully implemented yet.  
In our paper, we want to provide an alternative and complementary argument 
against an excessively one-sided view of enterprise within organisations. We want to 
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show that enterprise within a company is in itself an ambiguous organisational phe-
nomenon. Organisational practices and processes tied to enterprise within firms them-
selves, we argue, are (and must always be) complex. They can be liberating and con-
trolling, entrepreneurial and based on formal rules. This not only allows the rethinking 
of the ‘epochal bureaucracy/enterprise’ dualism” (du Gay 2004: 38), but also helps the 
understanding of enterprise within firms as complex, not only due to diverse individ-
ual reactions but due to the organisational mechanisms and practices connected with 
it. It allows attention to be paid to the fractures that are caused by bringing the ideal of 
the ‘individual self-made man’ (Schumpeter 1942) into an organisational setting and 
the results this may have for employee’s responses, the distribution of power and the 
issue of enterprise as a form of governance itself. 
Our analysis is inspired by Foucault’s later notion that power unfolds in a complex
interplay of a range of practices that span from pure ‘discipline’ and technologies of coer-
cion to self-technologies, and is not only repressive but also productive (Foucault 2005). 
‘Power consists in complex relations’ (Foucault 1993: 204), – it always leaves room for 
different reactions and interpretations of individuals. Foucault’s view thereby implies 
that it is important to focus on the practices and processes of organising (or individualising) 
themselves rather than on entities such as ‘individuals’ or ‘organisations’ only (Fou-
cault 2005; see also Haunschild 2003; Weiskopf 2005).  
Our empirical case study is a German branch of the Amway Corporation which 
operates worldwide. Amway is an entrepreneurial company par excellence which, when 
taking a closer look at the organisational practices and processes, allows reflection of 
the dichotomies mentioned above: On the one hand, Amway presents itself as a com-
pany of entrepreneurs where members are not employees but legally independent dis-
tributors and therefore business owners. This formal independence is also supported 
with strong entrepreneurial ideals, such as autonomy and self-responsibility 
(Schwarz/Schwarz 2002: 74). On the other hand, Amway is said to be controlling its 
members to such an extent that some former members of the company regard it as a 
cult-like and even repressive organisation (Butterfield 1985; Groß 2008; Scheibeler 
2004). How these issues are interlinked and how not only entrepreneurial ideals but 
also formal rules come into play when creating a company of entrepreneurs will be 
shown in our analysis, providing the basis for demonstrating the complexity of enter-
prise within organisations. 
In the next section, we start with an outline of the concept of enterprise and its 
connected discourses. The following section presents background information about 
the Amway Corporation and the method used in our case study, after which we move
on to a description of the entrepreneurial elements within Amway and of how these 
are connected with self-determination and control at the same time. After that, we 
show how ‘entrepreneurial’ and bureaucratic practices are intertwined under the roof 
of enterprise. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the different mechanisms 
and processes that we have identified interlink entrepreneurial, bureaucratic, liberating, 
and controlling aspects and of the implications this entails for future research. 
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2.  An outline of  enterprise in organisations 
The prominence of enterprise started in the late 1970s and gained strength during the 
1980s. As the Japanese economy was regarded as a threat to the West in terms of 
price, quality, and innovation, Japanese working practices in combination with entre-
preneurial behaviour seemed to be the answer for economically struggling Western 
organisations (Miller/Rose 1995). Additionally, a change of political ideals took place, 
predominantly in the UK and the US, as the New Right discussed ‘national life in 
terms of its neglect of the values of autonomy, entrepreneurship, and individual self-
motivation’ (Miller/Rose 1995: 453).  
Since then, enterprise has become a new paradigmatic concept underpinning ‘the 
rationale of new, alternative work forms and relationships’ (Storey et al. 2005: 1033). 
Crucial to this new form of work is a specific understanding of personhood (du Gay 
2004); the worker is regarded as an individual seeking self-fulfilment in all areas of life 
– both on and off the job. Even more, work is seen as the central place for self-
realisation, having become ‘a realm now construed as one in which we produce, dis-
cover, and experience our selves, rather than to be emancipated from work’ (Miller/ 
Rose 1995: 457). As a result, not only organisations, but rather every single employee 
is asked to be entrepreneurial (du Gay et al. 1996). This applies to any kind of organi-
sation as well as to any kind of work done – by managers as well as by workers 
(Burchell 1993; Miller/Rose 1995). Accordingly, enterprise not only refers to a pre-
ferred form of organising, but also to a set of individual characteristics such as auton-
omy, initiative, proactive behaviour, self-regulation, self-reliance and a sense of re-
sponsibility for oneself, or even the necessity to establish oneself as a brand or busi-
ness (du Gay 2004; Gordon 2001; Heelas/Morris 1992; Kets de Vries 1996; Storey et 
al. 2005). 
The notion of such entrepreneurialism within organisations has produced quite 
diverse discourses and we identify, in particular, two dichotomies that have become 
associated with the notion of enterprise. 
First, from the very beginning, enterprise has been positioned in absolute opposi-
tion to bureaucracy. Already in the 1980s, for example, the emerging ‘excellence litera-
ture’ (Willmott 1993) proclaimed that excellent and outstanding for-profit organisa-
tions display entrepreneurial characteristics that can overcome the manifold shortcom-
ings of bureaucratic organisations (Peters/Waterman 1982). The latter was, and still is, 
often presented as including rigid structures, strict adherence to procedures and little 
room for manoeuvre for employees, a lack of innovativeness and missing individual 
enthusiasm for organisational goals (du Gay et al. 1996). In particular, in earlier aca-
demic discourse (du Gay/Salaman 1992; du Gay 1994; du Gay et al. 1996), this oppo-
sition is regarded as the central characteristic of enterprise (Fournier/Grey 1996).  
The second dichotomy, which has attracted even more attention, is to some ex-
tent fed from this perceived contrast between enterprise and bureaucracy. Building on 
the difference of enterprise from rigid bureaucracies, advocates of entrepreneurialism 
promise that not only will organisations profit from outcomes such as higher flexibil-
ity, increased innovation, and higher level of commitment, but in an entrepreneurial 
company, the workforce is said to benefit from a workplace that supports individual 
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self-development and self-fulfilment (Peters/Waterman 1982). Such intriguing prom-
ises include self-determination and the opportunity to use one’s own discretion in-
stead of being constrained by centralised and bureaucratic regulations (Purser/Cabana 
1998). Whereas traditional management thinking leaves no doubt that the interests of 
the owner of a business and its managers and the concerns of the workers are clearly 
opposed to each other, authors of the excellence literature suggest that both groups 
may now strive unanimously for the common success of the company (Ouchi 1981; 
Peters/Waterman 1982).
However, while advocates of an enterprise orientation inside organisations 
propagate the concept as a win-win situation for companies and employees, within 
critical management studies it is characterised as a form of intrusive management con-
trol (Burchell 1993; du Gay/Salaman 1992; Miller/Rose 1990; Rose 1990; Storey et al. 
2005). Here, enterprise is regarded as a means to obtain power over employees: Indi-
viduals are influenced to act, think, and feel in accordance with the goals of the com-
pany and thus the very ‘inside’ of the individuals is formed (Kunda 1992: 12; Willmott 
1993). Weber (1968) claims that ‘we are placed in various orders of life, each of which 
is subject to different laws’, which implies that there is not a single ethic that could 
claim universality for a person‘s identity. However, authors such as Peters/Waterman 
(1982) ‘demand that all areas of life should be united, and that the individual over-
comes the alienating distinction between the different social roles she is forced to in-
habit’ (du Gay 2000a: 10). While advocates see this as positive, critics point out that 
the integration of different roles into one, organisationally defined way of life implies 
the risk of constraining personal autonomy and individuality (Kunda 1992; Willmott 
1993), thus leading to  equally or even more powerful control over employees than 
earlier measures of discipline, direct control or authority (Rose 1990). The danger thus 
results from the far-reaching claim that individuals should constantly strive for self-
fulfilment, becoming a creator of their own life, while the goal and the direction of 
this process is towards becoming the pre-defined, organisationally appropriate indi-
vidual (Burchell 1993). Here, the notion of enterprise in particular supports the blur-
ring of boundaries between individuals and organisation; as individual fulfilment is 
propagated, enterprise plays the ‘role of relay between objectives that are economically 
desirable and those that are personally seductive’ (Burchell 1993; du Gay et al. 1996; 
Garrick/Usher 2000; Miller/Rose 1990; Willmott 1992). 
To summarise, the concept of enterprise and its associated discourses have often 
evolved around these two dualisms: first, enterprise as opposed to bureaucracy and 
second, enterprise as a liberating development versus an intrusive form of control. A 
small number of more recent studies, however, have started to give a richer view of 
enterprise by directly or indirectly challenging these two dichotomies.  
One challenge regarding the first dualism – enterprise versus bureaucracy – is, for 
example, connected to how the discourse of enterprise is reproducing itself within 
academia (see also Fenwick 2008; Fournier/Grey 1999). In their analysis of academic 
literature on enterprise, Fournier and Grey (1999) claim that a large part of the popu-
larity of enterprise is due to ‘overlooking the bureaucratic elements which coexist with 
the logic of enterprise’ (1999: 113), or to even denoting bureaucratic elements as en-
trepreneurial, e.g. in the case of TQM, which is based on a whole set of formal rules. 
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As, according to Fournier and Grey, the early discourse was based on evidence mainly 
drawn from management guru literature; there is some danger in reproducing the 
claims made there within academia, e.g. enterprise as a solution for the battle with red 
tape (see also Cohen 1992; Fournier/Grey 1999; Ogbor 2000).  
A further point of critique regarding the dichotomy between enterprise and bu-
reaucracy can be found within Courpasson’s (2000) work (see also Fournier/Grey 
1999). Based on two case studies, the author points out that ‘soft’, e.g. normative con-
trol and coordination, go hand in hand with hierarchical and formal bureaucratic prac-
tices. Some post-bureaucratic logic and mechanisms, such as decentralisation, seem to 
support rather than contradict a bureaucratic and hierarchical logic (Courpasson 2000; 
see also McDonald et al. 2008; Salaman/Storey 2008). Tracing the organisational as 
well as societal developments that have been described by organisation theorists, 
Courpasson and Dany (2003) develop this argument further on a conceptual level. As 
managers nowadays are confronted with an empowered workforce, they need to seek 
sources of authority and obedience that are different from the ones connected with 
bureaucracy. Therefore, bureaucratic rules are not substituted, but rather supple-
mented with democratic, entrepreneurial, and self-controlling aspects; ‘to allow the 
company to be what some want it to be (a world of initiative, participation, creativity, 
and commitment), it has also to be a world of rules, structures, control and morality, 
which allows the checking of acts and which distinguishes between understandable, 
acceptable and unacceptable errors and conducts as well as between normal and ex-
ceptional successes.’ (Courpasson/Dany 2003: 1253; see also Korczynski 2004). Ac-
cording to the authors, post-bureaucratic organisations are not non-bureaucratic, but 
‘hybrids’ that allow managers to gain obedience that is legitimised by administrative, 
rational, and moral bases. 
The second dichotomy of enterprise being either a means of control or a way to 
self-determination has also been questioned. While acknowledging that there are ‘‘pre-
ferred’ readings of the [enterprise] discourse’ (p. 46), Cohen and Musson (2000), for 
example, point out that the effects of the discourse and associated organisational ef-
forts are not monolithic and that individuals may to some extent respond and react 
differently to entrepreneurial ideas and mechanisms (see also Bröckling 2007; Doolin 
2002; Storey et al. 2005). Independent from the notion of enterprise, Musson and 
Duberley (2007) further emphasise the complexity of the relationship between any 
discourse and identity, with their data suggesting that the ‘attempt at managerial con-
trol is mediated by other factors, not least the existence of competing and contradic-
tory managerial discourses’ (p. 157). Halford and Leonard (2006) even point out that 
individuals actively draw on diverse and also competing discourses to construct their 
subjectivity and McDonald et al. (2008) demonstrate how employees can actively take 
benefit from a change programme inspired by the notion of enterprise.  
These more recent studies show that enterprise within organisations is a more 
complex phenomenon than it had been portrayed in the beginning: Individuals can act 
and react differently in relation to entrepreneurial discourses (Halford/Leonard 2006; 
McDonald et al. 2008; Musson/Duberley 2007) and entrepreneurial as well as non-
entrepreneurial discourses can co-exist within one and the same company (Courpas-
son/Dany 2003; Korczynski 2004).  
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In the following analysis, we want to take the argument one step further and sug-
gest an extended understanding of enterprise within firms itself. Though the aforemen-
tioned recent studies deepen the view of enterprise to a large extent, the perspective is 
still narrow. First, by still taking the opposition between enterprise and bureaucracy (at 
least implicitly) for granted, the linkage between enterprise and bureaucracy on the 
level of the organisation is mainly regarded as contradictory. Second, while it has been 
highlighted that individuals can react differently towards enterprise, the complex or-
ganisational practices on which these reactions are based have not gained attention. 
Therefore we want to show that enterprise within organisations is a complex organisa-
tional phenomenon, i.e. it unfolds through practices that are both liberating and con-
trolling and it can be based not only on entrepreneurial ideals but also on bureaucratic 
rules, which can either restrict or support enterprise.  
Our attempt to analyse the complexity of enterprise as a way of governing an 
organisation is inspired by Foucault’s later ideas of government and power (1993, 
2005). He describes power relations as complex and focuses not only on the ‘what’ 
and ‘why’ of power, but first of all on the ‘how’ (see also Haunschild 2003; Weiskopf 
2005). For Foucault (2005: 256), power is ‘an ensemble of acts. These acts comply with 
possible acts and proceed in an area of possibilities for the behaviour of acting subjects. Power per-
suades, tempts, offers incentives, simplifies or complicates matters; power expands or 
reduces the opportunities of action, it increases or decreases the possibility of action.’1
Thus, when reflecting on the issue of control and governance within organisations, 
one should be aware that power can only be practiced over free subjects, with power 
and freedom thus not necessarily excluding each other (Foucault 2005: 257). And the 
organisational act of governing itself, the processes and practices of power are already 
intricate (Foucault 1993, 2005), allowing us to understand enterprise within 
organisations as an entanglement of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic elements (first 
dualism) as well as controlling and liberating elements (second dualism).  
Our empirical evidence is based on research in the Amway Corporation that re-
flects these two dualisms. Amway’s particular characteristics are presented in the next 
section.  
3.  The Amway Corporation 
With more than three million sales representatives in over 80 countries and regions all 
over the world and a turnover of 6.4 billion US-Dollars (in 2005),2 Amway is one of 
the biggest direct selling companies world-wide.3 Like other direct selling organisa-
                                                          
1 This and all other quotes were translated by the authors. 
2 Source: www.amway.com/en/BusOpp/business-profile-10065.aspx,   
accessed on 11/21/2007. 
3 The label ‘Amway’ is usually used for the whole corporate group; the official name of the 
holding, however, is Alticor (www.alticor.com). It has four subsidiaries: Amway Corpora-
tion, Quixtar Inc., Access Business Group LLC, and Pyxis Innovations Inc. Unless oth-
erwise noted, information about the Amway corporation originates from   
www.amway.de/default.asp?zone=Ueber%20Amway&lan=de&num=2&sub=19,  
accessed on 12/27/2005. 
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tions, such as Tupperware or Mary Kay Cosmetics, it relies solely on distributing 
goods directly to consumers, mostly in their homes by door-to-door or party selling. 
Established in 1959, the company now produces approximately 450 products,4 with a 
portfolio covering cosmetics, nutritional supplements and health and cleaning prod-
ucts.5 The German affiliate of the Amway Corporation, Amway GmbH, was estab-
lished in 1975. Today, more than 85,000 salespeople and over 200 administrative em-
ployees work for the company in Germany, which generated a turnover of 119 million 
Euros in the business year of 2003/2004.6
An important aspect of authority structures is that distributors are self-employed 
and not subject to any formal authority; no one is legally subordinate to another (Big-
gart 1989; Sparks/Schenk 2001). Moreover, Amway is a so-called multi-level market-
ing organisation,7 allowing – or rather encouraging – its distributors to recruit and 
coach new salespeople. The new distributors become the ‘Downline’ of the recruiting 
member, who is consequently called ‘Upline’ by the new recruit. The Upline earns 
money by selling products, but also by having a share in the profits of its Downline 
(Brodie et al. 2002).  
To become a distributor, no formal qualifications are required. People from all 
backgrounds, all educational levels, and personal characteristics (Brodie et al. 2002) 
can join the organisation. With the help of their Downline’s sales, distributors can 
climb a job ladder with more than 30 levels. The first step is becoming a ‘3%er’, pro-
gressing to a ‘21%er’. From there, the levels go over to metals such as ‘Silver’, ‘Gold’, 
and ‘Platinum’ to still more precious materials such as ‘Ruby’, ‘Emerald’, and ‘Dia-
mond’ until the ‘Crown-Ambassador’ is reached (Amway GmbH (Ed.) 2007). Each 
level implies a higher status and more recognition in the company as well as additional 
commissions. In official material, for example, the level of ‘Diamond’ is presented in 
an exemplary way with a monthly revenue of 506,000 Euro of one’s whole group and 
a monthly commission of about 17,705 Euro for the head of the group (Schwarz/ 
Schwarz 2001).
Although members are self-employed, successful distributors are regarded as 
‘managers’ inside the company and the mentioned labels show their rank in a status 
hierarchy. Additionally, the company offers its own educational system to its self-
employed distributors with seminars, success manuals, weekly meetings etc. in order 
to train and motivate its members (Schwarz/Schwarz 2001, 2002, 2005).  
Official records about leaving the company are missing, and information about 
turnover rates in direct selling organisations is generally hard to find. Many distribu-
                                                          
4 Additionally, Amway cooperates with numerous firms via internet (www.amivo.de), offer-
ing their products and services with special conditions for Amway distributors. These ad-
ditional products range from wines to electronic devices by companies such as Philips, 
Kenwood or Kärcher (Amway Europe Ltd (Ed) 1999). 
5 Source: www.amway.de/default.asp?zone=products&lan=de&num=2&sub=87, accessed 
on 12/21/2006. 
6  Source: www.amivo.de/press_room01.html, accessed on 11/21/2007.
7 This is also called ‘network marketing’. 
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tors seem to leave the company without prolonging their membership agreement for a 
second year (Biggart 1989), and a study during the 1990s for Amway Japan reported a 
turnover rate between 60% and 70% (Croft/Woodruffe 1996). According to partici-
pant observation, most distributors start working for Amway as a sideline to a regular 
job or while taking care of their family (see also Brodie/Stanworth 1998). Instead of 
leaving the company, distributors can also just stop recruiting and selling products 
while remaining in Amway as so-called ‘passive members’, who every now and then 
buy products for personal use. Thus, Amway members split into three groups: a large 
group of members that are passive; a large group conducting their business on a part-
time basis; and a few highly involved, full-time entrepreneurs.  
4.  Method 
4.1  Data collection 
The case of Amway forms part of a wider study on direct selling companies in Ger-
many which was conducted over one and a half years in three companies (Groß 2008). 
The field work for Amway was conducted over a period of six months and was based 
on data triangulation (Stake 2005) including participant observation (Girtler 2001), 
qualitative interviews (Rubin/Rubin 1995) and documentary analysis (Bryman/Bell 
2003).
The first author took part in 16 weekly meetings, with each meeting lasting 
around one and a half hours. During these evenings, further invitations to smaller, 
privately organised meetings were received and accepted. Additionally, a big semi-
annual rally in Austria with approximately 1,500 people was attended. These events 
are designed for distributors, but (paying) guests are also welcome. Observations from 
the mentioned events were logged in a research journal.  
Parallel to the participant observation, twelve semi-structured face-to-face inter-
views with 19 members including seven couples were conducted. Potential interview 
partners were met at local meetings, taking a snowballing approach. Additionally, 
members were interested themselves in bringing the first author into contact with 
other successful members or up-climbers – an approach that was openly described as 
guaranteeing that she would talk to the ‘right people’ in Amway. Interview partners 
ranged in age from their early twenties to their mid-fifties. One fifth of them had an 
academic background, mainly in medicine and biology. Three-quarters had a voca-
tional training, ranging from automotive electrical mechanic to driving instructor to 
industrial clerk. One third of the interview partners had been self-employed before 
they started their Amway business or was still self-employed in addition to it. Most in-
terview partners had been a member of Amway for more than five years, up to 24 
years. Two of them re-entered the company after pausing for a while because they had 
gotten divorced from their earlier partners with whom they had built up their Amway 
business.
The focus on these rather successful and ambitious members helped us to iden-
tify the organisational arrangements within Amway. As the goal of our paper is to 
show the complexity of enterprise within an organisation, it was important to consider 
alternative views on the company. These were gained on the basis of six interviews 
with seven non-members, six of whom were former distributors (one couple) and one 
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an external observer, whose friends had joined the Amway Corporation. These inter-
views where held face to face, via phone, via e-mail or two of the above.  
Table 1:  Interview partners 
Interview partners  
(partly married couples) 
Seniority Quoted as … 
Active members  
1 x 18%er 5 years ‘18%er’ 
1 x 21%er 1,5 years ‘21%er’ 
4 x Platinum From 8 to 14 years  ‘Platinum 1’, ‘Platinum 2’ … 
4 x Ruby From 6 to 14 years ‘Ruby 1’, ‘Ruby 2’ … 
2 x Emerald 15 and 24 years ‘Emerald 1’, ‘Emerald 2’ 
Former members  Up to 4 years ‘Former member without level of success’ 
‘Former 3%er’ 
‘Former 15%er’ 
‘Former 18%er’ 
‘Former Ruby’ 
External observer without 
membership
 ‘External observer’ 
Interviews with both active members and former members lasted between one and 
two hours on average and were recorded as well as fully transcribed. In our analysis, 
distributors are quoted according to the labels they currently have inside the company, 
e.g. as an ‘18%er’, ‘21%er’, ‘Platinum’ or ‘Ruby’ (active distributors) or the level they 
had held (former distributors), e.g. ‘former 18%er’ (see table 1).  
In addition to participant observation and interviews, our research is based on 
the analysis of official company documents such as websites,8 self-help manuals 
(Schwarz/Schwarz 2001, 2002, 2005), the monthly German in-house magazine ‘Ama-
gram’ (Amway GmbH (Ed.) 2004d), and international publications by the Amway 
founders Jay Van Andel (1998) and Rich de Vos (1994). Further documentary re-
search includes critical websites such as ‘Amway: the untold story’ or ‘MLM watch’.9
These offer personal reports by former distributors and their perception of the Am-
way Corporation. Some former distributors have also published their own books 
about their experiences as Amway members (Andrews 2001; Bloch 1996; Dean 1996; 
Scheibeler 2004).  
4.2  Data analysis 
For our analysis we used an inductive approach (Miles/Huberman 1994), iteratively 
defining and developing our codes by recursive analysis of the data. As we could also 
refer to and build upon the broader data generated by the wider empirical study and 
thus information on other direct selling companies, we could better understand the 
very specific ideals and organisational arrangements of Amway (Yin 2003). In addi-
                                                          
8 Source: www.schwarz-diamond-connection.de, www.amway.de, www.amway.com. 
9 Source: www.cs.cmu.edu/%7Edst/Amway/AUS/ and http://www.mlmwatch.org/. 
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tion, the different kinds of sources, namely interviews and observations made on the 
local level and international publications by the Amway Corporation (Van Andel 1998; 
de Vos 1994), enabled us to go back and forth between the different data and refine 
our understanding and our codes (Yin 2003). 
The Amway organisation can be characterised by a paradoxical situation: on the 
one hand, distributors are self-employed and consequently they are entrepreneurs; on 
the other hand, distributors are members and therefore part of a corporation. The first 
step was to find out how members and former members perceive themselves and the 
company, especially in which respects they regard the company as entrepreneurial and 
in which respects controlling. Crucial for the entrepreneurial side were also central be-
liefs and values displayed and transferred in the company, i.e. ‘freedom’, ‘self-
responsibility’ and the ‘chance to fulfil one’s own dreams’. The restrictive elements 
were mainly mentioned by the former members who reported a lack of freedom, the 
need to comply with rules and social pressure from the Upline. The complexity – and 
ambiguity – of enterprise within the company also became obvious by analysing the 
documents of supporters and critics of Amway and by comparing the field notes of 
the participant observation with reports from former members (Scheibeler 2004; Son-
nabend 1998). 
The second step was to have a closer look at the unusual organisational structure 
of the company. On the one hand, some central characteristics of bureaucracy are 
missing, starting with a work contract and a formal authority; on the other hand, many 
formal aspects are still present, e.g. a highly elaborated commission system with Am-
way’s ‘ladder of success’ (Schwarz/Schwarz 2001). Here, the document analysis of 
Amway’s regulation (Amway 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2004e) helped to understand the 
complexity and the scope of formal rules within the company. 
These different aspects together, i.e. liberating and controlling based on enter-
prise, and the lack- as well as the existence of bureaucratic rules, led to a complex and 
partially contradictory picture of the organisational arrangements within Amway. 
Building on this diversity, in the following we will challenge the two dichotomies 
prevalent in the literature.  
5.  Enterprise within Amway 
The preceding sections have made it clear that the notion of enterprise as a monolithic 
concept is obsolete (Fournier/Grey 1999; Musson/Duberley 2007; Salaman/Storey 
2008; Storey et al. 2005). In the next section we want to provide empirical evidence 
for the idea that not only individual reactions to entrepreneurial discourses are mani-
fold, ambivalent, or even contradictory, but that the concept of enterprise within 
companies as such is an ambiguous organisational phenomenon. We thus want to 
challenge both the idea of enterprise within organisations as either liberating or an in-
strument of (repressive) control as well as the idea of enterprise being counterfactual 
to bureaucracy.  
Based on Foucault’s (Foucault 1993, 2005) idea of the complexity of power and 
governance and the importance of the practices and processes tied to these issues, in 
the following we first point out how organisational entrepreneurial elements in Am-
way foster self-determination, while at the same time serving as a means of control 
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(5.1). Subsequently, we will show that entrepreneurial processes include bureaucratic 
rules and norms (5.2).  
5.1  Enterprise within Amway – self-determination and control 
How entrepreneurial ideals support freedom and self-determination 
As already described above, Amway is an entrepreneurial company and a company of 
entrepreneurs in many respects. Indeed, seen from an organisational level and irre-
spective of the concrete perception on the part of the company’s members, those 
characteristics that advocates of ‘enterprise within organisations’ usually associate with 
the concept are present, such as autonomy in determining one’s way of working, self-
responsibility, and following one’s own dreams (Peters/Waterman 1982).  
First of all, members are legally self-employed business people. Officially, distributors 
are called ‘business owners’ or even ‘IBOs’ (independent business owners) who do 
not sign a work-contract,10 but a membership agreement (Amway 2004d). This neither 
specifies how much time a member has to invest nor how many products one has to 
buy or sell (see also Wotruba et al. 2005). According to the membership agreement, 
distributors can work wherever and whenever they want because, unlike in most bu-
reaucratic organisations (Weber 1968), no common offices and office hours exist (ex-
cept for the employees of the headquarters and the production plants). Amway offers 
‘freedom, spare time and arranging the day as I like’ (Ruby 3). The status of legal in-
dependence is supported by the fact that there is no automatic renewal of member-
ship. Instead, each year distributors have to sign an agreement to remain members (Am-
way 2004d). Therefore, they not only have to be willing to pay their membership fee, 
but also have to make an active decision to go ahead with their Amway business. 
The formal independence is tightly connected with several entrepreneurial ideals. 
First, as Amway distributors own their business, they are their own bosses and as no dis-
tributor is legally subordinate to another, high-level distributors are not in ‘the privi-
leged position to give orders, to command – that won’t work’ (Ruby 4; Sparks/Schenk 
2001). Second, as entrepreneurs, distributors are not only able to decide how they 
work, but they are also self-responsible for their success and failure. ‘And of course, nobody 
has to tell me what I have to do…because it is my business, and that’s also part of it. 
If something doesn’t work, I take it on the chin!’ (Emerald 2). Third, having an 
Amway business is connected with the entrepreneurial ideal of following one’s own dreams.
As suggested by advocates of enterprise (Peters/Waterman 1982), the task of the 
company is to provide members with the opportunity to find their individual 
fulfilment. In the line of this argument, an Emerald explained that he has to coach the 
members of his Downline so that they find their individual goals. ‘As most 
people…have no goals, have no aims…[I help them to] reflect: ‘What kind of goals 
could I have…?’ (Emerald 1).  
Considering the formal independence as well as the entrepreneurial ideals within 
Amway, distributors contrasted their status with ordinary, salaried positions in bu-
reaucracy and the predetermined and over-directed working environments of the latter 
                                                          
10 Source: www.amway.com/en/globalcomm/united-states-canada-information.aspx,   
accessed on 4/21/2006. 
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– as is described in most of the literature on enterprise (du Gay 2004; Fournier/Grey 
1999). One distributor stated that in bureaucratic jobs, one ‘directs one’s energy on 
the achievement of objectives: someone else’s objectives’ (Platinum 2; see also popular 
accounts of (Bartlett 1994; Clothier 1992; Conn 1977). Or, as his spouse puts it: ‘when 
I imagine that there are people who work at machines, who spend eight hours a day 
on the shop floor, working alone, and who do this for 30-40 years; that’s a jail-
house…that’s torture, it’s unbelievable!’ (Platinum 2).  
In contrast to employees in a bureaucratic company, Amway distributors have 
their own businesses – and their own interests. The latter may also be disconnected 
from the Amway Corporation. This independence of members becomes clear when 
taking a look at distributors’ selling and recruiting activities, their seminar attendance, 
and their turnover rate. Considering that the individual average purchase is (only) 
around € 113 per month (including purchase for own use and for selling to non-
members),11 the average distributor seems unperturbed by the corporation’s interest in 
a high sales volume. Also the second core activity – recruiting new members – does 
not give the impression of being enforceable to a great extent. In local meetings all 
distributors who had recruited a new member the week before were honoured – 
which turned out to be only a small number of the regularly attending members. Even 
seminar attendance as such did not seem to be very high. Official data is missing, but 
participant observation showed that out of the 100-150 distributors who attended 
weekly meetings only a smaller proportion of approximately 20% were regulars. Last 
but not least, the aforementioned high fluctuation rate of distributors (Biggart 1989) 
indicates that the majority of members do not stay within Amway for a second year.  
While entrepreneurial characteristics and ideals offer Amway distributors oppor-
tunities for self-determination and autonomy, in the following section we will show 
that such a view of enterprise within Amway is too narrow. The entrepreneurial ideals 
within Amway also allow the company to control its members (Miller/Rose 1995) and 
thus, enterprise both contains self-determining and regulating aspects.  
How entrepreneurial ideals are connected with organisational control 
As we have seen above, Amway’s sales representatives are called ‘(independent) busi-
ness owners’ (Amway 2004d) in corporate language. The only prerequisites to becom-
ing an entrepreneur in Amway are a minimum age of 18 years, signing the member-
ship agreement, and paying a fee. Therefore, many people who have never worked in 
the field or run a business suddenly turn into ‘businessmen and -women’ – at least 
they receive this label by the company (Alvesson/Willmott 2002). Becoming a busi-
ness owner virtually ‘overnight’ implies that most of the distributors need some advice 
on how to run their Amway business and also on how to become an entrepreneur in 
general. Consequently, new members seek advice from their Upline and their so-called 
‘Sponsor’, i.e. the one who has recruited them. As implied in this latter label, this 
                                                          
11 The calculation includes 85,000 self-employed members in Germany with a total turnover 
of 119 Mio. € in 2003/2004 (source: www.amivo.de/press_room01.html, accessed on 
11/27/2006). Considering that members pay an annual fee (estimated 4 Mio. €/year), the 
purchase of products per member is on average € 113 per month. 
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should be someone who is supportive and protective, helping people to advance both 
personally and in their job. Indeed, a good Sponsor in Amway is regarded as an ‘all in 
one teacher, priest, business partner, spouse, and friend’ (Platinum 4).  
Additionally, Amway offers an extensive educational system to support its dis-
tributors. It consists of weekly meetings, national rallies, and a broad variety of litera-
ture on ‘how to become successful’ (Schwarz/Schwarz 2001; Schwarz/Schwarz 2002). 
In line with the independent status of the distributors, educational material and semi-
nars are called ‘advice’ – recommendations that cannot be enforced, but are ‘offers’ 
for success (Schwarz/Schwarz 2002; see also Alvesson/Willmott 2002). The content 
of this voluntary ‘advice’ is far-reaching as members are told how to behave, feel, and 
think as a good and appropriate entrepreneur, or more generally, as a ‘good worker’ 
(Sewell 1998: 405). A business support book titled ‘The way to success’, for example, 
suggests to ‘make sure you have a tidy flat, and, of course that you yourself give a neat 
impression, too. You represent a business. Dress yourself appropriately…Important: 
look motivated and cheerful because this is a cheerful business’ (Schwarz/Schwarz 
2002: 71). These recommendations reach right into distributors’ private lives. Being an 
– independent – business owner is thus connected with implicit ‘rules of the game’ 
(Alvesson/Willmott 2002) that help to control the Amway members normatively.  
One of these rules refers to the above mentioned self-responsibility for success and 
failure (Storey et al. 2005). Members are business owners and as such cannot blame 
others for lacking success – neither their Upline nor the company. Therefore, the 
entrepreneurial ideal of self-responsibility absolves the company from its own 
responsibility for any failure, as an official handbook explains, ‘every willing and hard-
working person can be successful in this business…we, as people, are subject to 
different influences…thus, we do not function equally well all the time. However, a 
good system always works!’ (Schwarz/Schwarz 2001: 2). Consequently, it is up to the 
individual to prove him- or herself worthy of being an entrepreneur. While a signature 
on the membership agreement makes distributors into business owners by label, in 
practice becoming an entrepreneur involves hard work, namely developing one’s own 
personality (Biggart 1983). As the co-founder Van Andel once said, the Amwaynian 
‘kind of freedom is only granted to a few humans. Everybody has to earn this freedom 
first by his never-ending quest and his personal vision’ (Schwarz/Schwarz 2005: 35). 
In accordance with critics of the ideal of enterprise (Burchell 1993; Rose 1990), within 
Amway the legally self-employed members have to be ‘continuously engaged in a pro-
ject to shape his or her life as an autonomous, choosing individual driven by the desire 
to optimise the worth of his or her own existence’ (du Gay et al. 1996: 269). Being 
self-responsible is part of this project and, as critics of the notion of enterprise point 
out, internalising control while regarding oneself as the master of one’s own life 
(Burchell 1993; Rose 1990; Sewell 1998; Willmott 1993). ‘Nowadays, I am laughing 80 
percent of the time. Even when I’m sitting in my car, I always make sure that the cor-
ners of my mouth are stretched because you have no reason to be sad! You pull all the 
strings yourself!’ (18%er). 
Distributors who successfully engage in the process of self-development are not 
only promised higher sales and recruiting numbers, but they are also honoured with a 
whole set of labels that show their status within the company. Labels (Alves-
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son/Willmott 2002) such as ‘Platinum’ or ‘Diamond’ not only show a level of success 
at work, but also one’s value as a person. They imply that one has been – to use the 
words of a distributor – ‘honed’ by one’s team, bit by bit, from a raw stone to a glitter-
ing diamond because ‘this [Diamond-]label does not exist without a reason, does it?’ 
(21%er). The one who has passed through this process also acquires authority; not in 
a formal sense, but ‘authority by success’ (Courpasson/Dany 2003) as a Double-
Diamond puts it in a speech at a 1,500-people rally, ‘If the Sponsor says: ‘Jump!’ 
Don’t ask, ‘why?’ Ask, ‘how high?’. Thus, although distributors are legally not subor-
dinate to another (Biggart 1989; Sparks/Schenk 2001), being a successful entrepreneur 
within the Amway system grants the moral right to tell others what to do and as such to be 
an archetype for other members.  
The possibilities for archetypes to tell how they work and what made them suc-
cessful are many. While in local weekly meetings, one product presentation of three to 
five minutes was scheduled,12 during the semi-annual seminar the products of the 
company were not relevant. The seminar consisted mainly of the following three ele-
ments: (1) videos with luxurious journeys, big cars, and other signs of opulence; (2) 
tributes to distributors who have climbed up the career-ladder; and (3) speeches from 
successful members. These are idolised by the audience, as a former distributor joked 
about a seminar, ‘once, there came a big shot to the [name] seminar….You’d think Je-
sus himself was turning up.…He was more admired and adored than Beckham and 
Ronaldo together’ (Former 3%er). To give another example, one speaker in a weekly 
meeting explained that he always had some journals about luxurious vacations and 
dream houses on hand for recruitment talks. Showing these journals to his guests, but 
also having them lying around ‘coincidentally’, helped him to activate the ‘individual’ 
dreams of potential new members. 
The formal right to follow one’s own dreams through the Amway business is here 
connected with the aforementioned need to learn how to be (and become) a business 
person as well as with the presentation of successful members as archetypes and 
counsellors. As within any company, Amway cannot enforce compliance with the 
propagated ideals (Gabriel 1999; Spicer/Böhm 2007), but the company uses meetings, 
taped speeches, and written manuals to influence these ‘individual’ dreams in line with 
the ‘Am-way’ of doing business. According to Pratt (Pratt 2000b), individual aspira-
tions and organisational interests are aligned in two steps. First, individual meaning is 
broken down with ‘sensebreaking practices’, e.g. with a practice called ‘dream build-
ing’. ‘By reminding an individual of what one can have (e.g., a new car, a better family) 
and/or what one can become (e.g., wealthy)…it creates a type of identity deficit or a mis-
fit between who one is and who one wants to become’ (Pratt 2000b: 467, original 
emphasis). In a second step, new meaning and new wishes – basically a ‘better self’ 
(Willmott 1993) – are provided via ‘sensegiving’ practices (Pratt 2000b). Thus, al-
though ideals such as ‘self-fulfilment’ refer to individual developments, the concrete 
                                                          
12 Source:  
www.schwarz-diamond-connection.de/neu/german/content/schulungszentren.html,  
accessed on 1/24/2007. 
management revue, 20(4):  348-372 DOI 10.1688/1861-9908_mrev_2009_04_Gross  363
meaning of what exactly makes up an Amway business owner and his or her successful 
life is propagated by the company (Koehn 2001). 
Not all members want to follow Amway’s understanding of autonomy and self-
responsibility. In the above section we pointed out that the high fluctuation rates of 
distributors show that many Amway members do indeed follow their individual goals 
within Amway and many even leave the company. This high turnover of distributors 
leads to a kind of ‘self-selection’. As one distributor puts it, ‘people find Amway. He 
who fits, understands it [the business]…but others would not feel comfortable here 
and they will not come again’ (Ruby 2). The legal self-employment and the need to ac-
tively prolong the membership each year facilitate the company exit but also support 
the homogeneity within Amway; many members leave, but the ones who remain seem 
to form an even more like-minded community (Pratt 2000a), the community of ‘Am-
waynians’ – as several interview partners labelled themselves. For them, outside con-
nections may become unnecessary or even problematic – a reason why direct selling 
organisations are sometimes denoted as cult-like organisations (Scheibeler 2004). ‘Yes, 
today we have other friends than we had before. And these friends simply come from 
the Amway-business because here you somehow have the same interests. Of course 
we have another circle of friends and acquaintances…but, well, this is not the kind of 
environment in which we want to be’ (Emerald 1).  
To sum up, Amway members are self-determined and autonomous business 
owners in many respects, and at the same time they are embedded in normative con-
trol mechanisms based on enterprise (Pratt 2000a; Pratt 2000b). As a result, enterprise 
within Amway is neither liberating nor restrictive, but is rather a more complex organ-
isational concept than has been suggested by the literature so far. In the following sec-
tion we will challenge the second dichotomy linked with the concept of enterprise by 
showing how bureaucratic rules coexist with the identified entrepreneurial aspects. 
5.2  Bureaucratic elements in an entrepreneurial organisation  
As we have just seen, freedom and control on the basis of entrepreneurial elements 
coexist in Amway and enterprise within the company contains both enabling and re-
stricting aspects. Taking a closer look at Amway’s approaches, one can also detect that 
in spite of the deliberate contrasting of Amway with bureaucratic environments, bu-
reaucratic elements are quite prominent and exist in parallel with the entrepreneurial 
aspects. Entrepreneurs in Amway are embedded in a system of clear structures and 
impersonal, stable rules, although members are self-employed and the most obvious 
elements commonly associated with bureaucracy – e.g. a formal work contract and a 
formal authority structure (Weber 1968) – do not exist.  
First, the ‘membership agreement’ (Amway 2004d), ‘Amway rights and duties’ 
(Amway 2004a) and further regulations (Amway 2004b, 2004e) govern the relation-
ship between the distributors and the company. They define that distributors are busi-
ness owners and demarcate the scope and the limits of their independence. For exam-
ple, Amway’s rules do not define working hours or a minimum sale and they reserve 
the right to cancel the membership agreement at any time (Amway 2004d). Moreover, 
they include a ‘principle of equality’, ‘the option to become an Amway business part-
ner is open to all persons, regardless of their sex, race, nationality and political and re-
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ligious affiliation’ (Amway 2004a: 6). Then again, they also make clear that the content 
delivered in trainings for members and materials used in such trainings have to meet 
the requirements of the company and therefore the head office has to inspect and 
authorise them (Amway 2004b). Additionally, the duties of the Upline and the rela-
tionship between Upline and Downline are stipulated; those who recruit new mem-
bers should instruct, train, and motivate them so that they gain an ‘understanding for 
their duties as a business partner’ (Amway 2004a: 10). 
Second, the range of products distributors can choose from for their selling ac-
tivities is given: Amway produces and sells a certain number of products; asks for 
fixed and non negotiable retail prices; recommends the price of sale; and offers flyers 
for advertisement (Amway 2004c). Hence, Biggart (1989) believes that ‘distributors are 
not entrepreneurs. They perform highly routinised selling and recruiting behaviours. 
Innovation is neither necessary nor welcome’ (Biggart 1989: 163). 
Third, Amway possesses a considerable commission and reward system 
(Schwarz/Schwarz 2001). This defines clearly and in an impersonal way (Weber 1968) 
how one can (and also cannot) work one’s way up and how each of the more than 30 
steps of the career ladder can be climbed. A higher level entails additional commis-
sions according to a prefixed scheme effective and offers several rights, e.g. to wear 
pins that show one’s level of success and to speak on meetings and big rallies 
(Schwarz/Schwarz 2001). 
Thus, clear rules like the ones described in this section exist in parallel to entre-
preneurial elements, questioning the second dichotomy between enterprise and bu-
reaucracy. In the following, we will show that the entrepreneurial, bureaucratic, con-
trolling and liberating elements not only coexist, but are intertwined in multiple ways. 
6.  Discussing the complexity of  enterprise within companies  
In interviews, small meetings, and big seminars, Amway’s high-level distributors pre-
sented themselves as being enthusiastic about the opportunities for becoming a per-
sonally free entrepreneur within Amway. But we also found that many people did not 
come to weekly meetings, only bought products for private consumption, and did not 
seem interested in following the entrepreneurial ideals of the company. Moreover, 
most former members appeared to be dismissive of the company as they felt restricted 
by the abundance of implicit and explicit rules about how to think, act, and feel as an 
ideal ‘Amwaynian’ entrepreneur, ‘they put a noose around my neck, and – at one point 
– I realised it was slowly and definitely becoming too tight’ (Former 18%er). These re-
actions show how differently individuals can experience an entrepreneurial discourse 
within their organisations (Courpasson/Dany 2003; Musson/Duberley 2007).  
We suppose that this variety of individual reactions is not only based on organisa-
tional members’ individuality and agency (Storey et al. 2005) but on the complexity of 
enterprise as a means of governing organisations itself and the organisational processes and 
practices (unavoidably) tied to exercising power via enterprise in larger corporations.
Our data demonstrate that entrepreneurial aspects support individual liberation as well 
as organisational control (section 5.1). Moreover, enterprise not only co-exists with 
bureaucratic rules but is itself partially based on formal rules (section 5.2). It is, there-
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fore, no surprise that bureaucratic elements are ‘alive and well’ (Korczynski 2004:111) 
in entrepreneurial companies. 
Table 2:  The parallel existence of entrepreneurial, bureaucratic, liberating and  
regulating aspects within Amway 
Freedom Control 
Enterprise 
- being a legally independent business owner 
- no regulations about how many products to buy 
or sell  
- freedom to choose time, place, and amount of 
work as well as approach to work 
- need to actively renew membership 
- entrepreneurial ideals of autonomy, self-
responsibility, and following one’s own dreams 
are propagated within the company 
- entrepreneurial self-perception is supported by 
comparisons with ordinary ‘salaried’, ‘bureau-
cratic’ positions 
- the precise meaning of ‘enterprise’ and associ-
ated values is defined according to company  
interests with the help of an educational system 
(books, manuals, speeches, seminars) as well 
as control mechanisms such as sensebreaking 
and sensegiving  
- implicit and explicit rules transferred via the  
educational system are labeled ‘advice’  
- becoming an independent business owner  
virtually over night leads to the seeking of such 
advice
- business success within Amway leads to a 
status hierarchy that grants high-level distribu-
tors the moral right to tell others what to do 
- entrepreneurial ideal of self-responsibility is used 
to absolve company from responsibility for failure 
- easiness to exit company leads to self-selection 
of members. The remaining ones share a  
greater coherence of perceptions, attitudes, and 
world-views
Bureaucracy 
- membership agreement 
o guarantees legal independence 
o guarantees free choice of how, where,  
when, and how much to work 
- commission and reward systems define  
possibilities of earning money 
- membership agreement  
o defines duties of members and of Uplines 
- commission and reward systems define career 
path and limits of earning money  
- range of products and retail prices are given by 
company
Table two gives an overview of our findings thus far. First, the left part of the first 
row lists the various entrepreneurial elements within the company that support individ-
ual autonomy: the formal independence of distributors; the entrepreneurial ideals 
within the company; and the mechanisms supporting these ideals. Second, the right 
part of the first row summarises the control mechanisms that are connected with such entrepre-
neurial elements: an educational system, for example, that defines how the ideal ‘Am-
waynian’ business owner should think, act, and feel; or the labelling of implicit and 
explicit rules as ‘advice’ for self-employed distributors who want to become success-
ful. Third, the second row names the bureaucratic elements within Amway such as the 
membership agreement or the commission system. Here, the left part summarises 
formal rules that allow organisational members to act as entrepreneurs, while the right 
part shows rules that restrict distributors’ entrepreneurial autonomy.  
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As may have already become obvious in some parts of our descriptions, the ele-
ments we identified do not only exist in parallel with each other; rather they are tightly 
interwoven. In the following, we want to exemplify how these different facets of the 
entrepreneurial company Amway are interlinked. Thereby, it should become apparent 
that the following combinations are also connected with each other. 
First, enterprise can be liberating and controlling at the same time (first row of 
table 2). Even one and the same entrepreneurial element can support individual 
autonomy and be used as a mechanism of control at the same time, e.g. because lan-
guage, even if it is meant to produce a certain outcome/trigger a certain reaction, has 
different meanings and implies different ‘options’ of action. On the one hand, being 
an ‘independent business owner’ might convey and reinforce the notion of freedom 
and encourage people to design their business according to their own ideals and goals. 
This can include joining meetings without actually selling or recruiting others or 
choosing a life outside Amway (Scheibeler 2004). On the other hand, the explicit self-
responsibility connected to being an IBO might cause new and inexperienced mem-
bers to fall back on the rules and support of the company and their Upline. This sup-
port is labelled ‘advice’ within the company and is, of course, voluntary for the for-
mally independent members. As distributors can ‘actively’ choose to follow the com-
pany recommendations, the advice becomes credible and tempting. Following the ‘ad-
vice’ also implies that loyal members develop according to organisational norms – as 
has been noted by critics of the notion of enterprise (Burchell 1993; Rose 1990; Will-
mott 1993). Thus, the ideal of enterprise simultaneously contains both individual 
autonomy as an entrepreneur and following the advice of others. 
Second, bureaucratic rules can restrict but also enable enterprise within organisa-
tions (second row of table 2) and sometimes seem to be a necessary part of it. The 
self-employed status of Amway distributors is based on a contractual arrangement (du 
Gay 2004), i.e. the membership agreement (Amway GmbH (Ed.) 2004d). This agree-
ment also states that distributors are free to choose where and how much they work. 
Formal rules make the claim of Amway credible, namely offering autonomy, self-
responsibility as well as the chance to fulfil one’s own dreams. At the same time, bu-
reaucratic rules can also foil these ideals. Thus, the same or other regulations also indi-
cate clearly that the content delivered in seminars and so-called ‘business support ma-
terials’ such as manuals has to be authorised by the company (Amway GmbH (Ed.) 
2004b). As a result, our data give empirical evidence for how bureaucratic rules sup-
port as well as restrict liberating entrepreneurial ideas (Courpasson/Dany 2003). 
Third, entrepreneurial autonomy is supported by entrepreneurial ideals but can 
also be based on bureaucratic rules (first column of table 2). As we have seen, Am-
way’s distributors are motivated by the belief that they can act as ‘independent busi-
ness owners’. Considering their legal status as self-employed distributors they do in-
deed have the freedom to work according to their individual rhythm. That is to say, 
the rules and the formal status form the basis of (the ideal of) being an entrepreneur 
within Amway. 
Fourth, the controlling side of enterprise within organisations can be based on 
entrepreneurial ideals but also on formal rules (second column of table 2). The entre-
preneurial characteristic of self-responsibility functions as a normative control mecha-
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nism to absolve the company from any responsibility for failure; whoever does not 
succeed did not work hard enough or worked in an incorrect way (Schwarz/Schwarz 
2001). Thompson calls this process ‘legitimation’ (Thompson 1984: 131), i.e. a control 
mechanism employed by companies to gain credibility for their particular organisa-
tional point of view (see also Potterfield 1999). This kind of control is further ‘legiti-
mised’ and supported by formal and impersonal rules (Kärreman/Alvesson 2004) that 
restrict entrepreneurial autonomy, such as the legal independence of distributors and 
the commission system, which also put the responsibility for failure in the hands of 
the employees. 
These four combinations demonstrate that practices in an entrepreneurial organi-
sation are a complex net of traditional entrepreneurial and bureaucratic, liberating and
controlling elements.  
7.  Conclusion 
We are said to live in an ‘age of enterprise’ where profit and non-profit organisations 
as well as individuals are pushed to become more entrepreneurial. While some authors 
and management gurus in particular have pointed out the liberating notion behind en-
terprise, critical management studies agree on enterprise within organisations being an 
instrument of power and governance – albeit one that individuals can respond to dif-
ferently and that can co-exist with bureaucratic control.  
Inspired by Foucault’s (1993, 2005; see also Weiskopf 2005) understanding of 
power relations as complex, as productive and repressive, and as enabling and restrict-
ing human/individuals’ actions, our analysis suggests a broader picture of enterprise 
within firms: it cannot be seen as a self-sufficient and clear-cut organisational concept, 
but organisational practices and processes connected with enterprise (sometimes nec-
essarily) comprise different organisational values as well as bureaucratic structures and 
rules. Thus, our example empirically underlines the idea that enterprise within a com-
pany does not exist alone (see also Fournier/Grey 1999) – and cannot exist alone. In 
this sense, entrepreneurial practices or ‘mechanisms’ of transferring and implementing 
entrepreneurial ideas, such as language, contracts or motivation and systems of pay-
ment, which have played a major role in the issues identified in section 5 will not only 
evoke diverse reactions. Rather, they will always, within the framework of being en-
trepreneurial within a company, make use of or be based upon rules and structures 
normally excluded or even denied in the entrepreneurial discourse. 
As the Amway Corporation has not only a strong entrepreneurial organisational 
culture but also self-employed distributors without fixed working hours or common 
offices, its members are close to being ‘real’ entrepreneurs. This facilitates the empiri-
cal demonstration of how entrepreneurial practices and ideals are entangled with non-
entrepreneurial ones. In most other companies the different characteristics or dimen-
sions may be more difficult to identify and may be less clear-cut. However, this does 
not imply that enterprise is less complex there. On the contrary, we suppose that 
‘normal’ companies wishing to become entrepreneurial may actually display more 
complexity. Organisations where members are ‘regularly’ employed have an even 
higher need to bring together dual – and potentially contradicting – logics (Korczynski 
2004). Professional service firms such as consultancies, for example, also propagate 
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and to some extent offer self-fulfilment and professional autonomy, having strong or-
ganisational cultures at the same time (Alvesson/Kärreman 2004; Kärreman/Alvesson 
2004). It might be precisely this double promise that makes entrepreneurial companies 
so seductive for loyal members. And it might be the tight inter-linkage of entrepreneu-
rial ideals with bureaucratic rules – in the case of a consultancy e.g. professional 
autonomy and self-realisation based on a clearly hierarchical job ladder – that allows 
organisations to suggest a sense of enterprise and self-fulfilment to its employees 
while at the same time predefining their path (Groß 2008). We suppose that under-
standing enterprise as a complex phenomenon facilitates the research of the manifold 
relationships between liberating and controlling aspects as well as between entrepre-
neurial ideals and formal rules, and the effects this has on employees and the distribu-
tion of power within a company.  
Therefore, one implication of understanding enterprise as connected with mani-
fold and partially contradictory organisational practices is that the discourses inspired 
by management are not as monolithic as they may seem from the outside (Cohen/ 
Musson 2000). It has been shown that employees resist, comply with or even react 
differently towards managerially inspired enterprise discourses (Cohen/Musson 2000; 
Halford/Leonard 2006; McDonald et al. 2008). Regarding enterprise itself as a com-
plex phenomenon, however, that is based on a broad variety of partially contradictory 
and partially re-enforcing organisational practices which do not only comprise typical 
entrepreneurial ideas and mechanism, offers broader/deeper insights and more start-
ing points for future research: What contradictions and consistencies result from the 
inter-linkages on the organisational level? What messages does the organisation 
thereby (consciously or unconsciously) transmit? Which constraints or advantages – or 
even seductions – arise for the employees and how do they respond? And how do 
these issues affect the power and governance of the organisation? Last but not least, 
what does this mean for the phenomenon of enterprise within firms as such? 
A second implication is that enterprise as a complex phenomenon allows the re-
evaluation of the role of bureaucratic elements in organisation in particular and 
thereby overcoming the ‘epochal bureaucracy/enterprise’ dualism’ (du Gay 2004: 38). 
Our empirical data show that enterprise and bureaucracy are not principally in opposi-
tion to each other but rather that they are two ways of organising and governing that 
can co-exist or even support each other – be it to liberate or to control. The strong di-
chotomy between the two thus seems to be less rooted in organisational reality than in 
the entrepreneurial discourse itself, in a highly stylized and normative approach (for 
the normative aspects of enterprise see also Bröckling 2007). Based on our observa-
tions, it becomes possible to (re-)consider the productive, potentially enabling or even 
liberating aspects of bureaucracy – a view that may have lost attraction because the 
ideal of enterprise has been in the spotlight in management but also in academia (du 
Gay 2000; Fournier/Grey 1999).  
Thus, ultimately, we agree with Fournier and Grey (1999), who have claimed that 
it is necessary to specify more carefully what one means when drawing on this term 
and when analysing how others employ it. As the discourse according to Fournier and 
Grey some years ago was based on evidence mainly drawn from management guru lit-
erature, they point out the danger of reproducing the claims of guru literature in aca-
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demia (see also Cohen 1992; Ogbor 2000). A shortcoming of a one-sided view on en-
terprise, a positive or a critical one, is that it does not take into account the paradoxi-
cal nature of enterprise within organisations. Enterprise within organisations requires 
that organisational members are entrepreneurs and parts of a company at the same time. This 
implies that they have some autonomy but are also controlled; it implies that they may 
be inspired by an entrepreneurial discourse which can be in opposition to formal rules 
or also be supported by them. Originally, the entrepreneur is the individual ‘self made 
man’ who takes initiative, is creative and autonomous and sets up his own business 
(Schumpeter 1942). Transferring this notion with its idealised characteristics into or-
ganisations will always cause fractures and contradicting answers to the question what 
enterprise is and how it affects organisational members.  
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